Assessing GoT/TRC Programming for Gender Sensitivity: Turkey's Reaction to a Regional Nightmare

According to a report by the International Crisis Group, on April 29, 2011, the first group of 250 Syrians crossed into Hatay, seeking shelter from an upsurge in violence at home. By October 2012, over 100,000 refugees had made their way into urban and camp areas,[1] and the most recent estimates by UNHCR suggest that 194,000 Syrians now live in Turkish camps and 210,000 Syrians have established residence either with family or on their own in urban locales. Based on current migration trends and no foreseeable end to the fighting in Syria, the UNHCR further predicts that Turkish camps and cities could host up to 300,000 and 700,000 people, respectively.[2]

The GoT currently extends a regime of Temporary Protection to Syrians who have fled the conflict and are now living within Turkey. In legal terms, this falls short of full refugee status and results in the absence of the ability to: apply for transfer to third countries as UN-recognized refugees; participate legally in the work force; and, formally enter educational institutions. The Temporary Protection regime stems from Turkey’s signing of the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol geographical limitation, which translates to zero recognition of refugees from outside European borders.[3]

Currently, there are 19 fully functional camps in varying proximity to the Turkish-Syrian border. The following is a list of regions and associated camps that house and provide basic services and security to registered Syrians: Adana (Adana camp), Adiyaman (Adiyaman camp), Gaziantep (Islahiye, Nizip-1, Karkamis, Nizip-2 camps), Kilis (Kilis camp), Hatay (Altinozu, Boynuyogun, Apaydin, Yayladagi-1, Yayladagi-2 camps), Karhamanmaras (Kahramanmaras camp), Osmaniye (Duzici, Cevdetiye camps), and Sanliurfa (Ceylanpinar, Harran, Akcakale camps). 5 camps are container camps, 2 camps are comprised of pre-fabricated units, and the remaining are tent camps.[4] According to WFP, the Turkish Government plans to cap the building of new camps to 21 total.[5]

The cost of providing for displaced Syrians has been and continues to be enormous, with the Turkish Government footing a sizable portion of the bill. To date, ICG estimates that the GoT has spent $750 million on the construction, staffing and maintenance of camps. As of April 2013, GoT was spending $50 – 60 million a month on caring for refugees.[6]

Within the camps, AFAD, which is the division of the Turkish Government that handles emergencies and disasters, and TRC personnel are solely responsible for camp management and program implementation. AFAD also closely coordinates with various line ministries (e.g. the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Family and Social Services, etc.) to provide essential services to camp residents. As one UN representative put it, this approach differs significantly from the refugee camp structure preferred by the UN when it is the apparatus in charge; in other words, each agency within the UN typically designs and operates programs within its mandate, which, in effect, creates a kind of siloed and sector-specific approach to refugees’ needs. The Turkish Government, on the other hand, has opted for a top-down, camp management structure wherein the full range of refugee-related needs are addressed by government officials with respective expertise.[7]

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[1] International Crisis Group. P. 5.

[2] UNHCR RRP 5, p. 213

[3] International Crisis Group. P. 5.

[4] International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. “Emergency Appeal: Turkey: Population Movement.” May 28, 2013.

[5] WFP Official. Interview. July 18, 2013.

[6] Ibid.

[7] WFP Official. Interview. July 18, 2013.

Assessing GoT/TRC Programming for Gender Sensitivity: Gender, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Programming - Themes

Before beginning a discussion of various findings and an analysis of gaps and strengths in GoT/TRC programming, it makes sense to review some of the more salient themes connecting gender, conflict and humanitarian assistance programming. The goal here is to situate the reader with a rapidly expanding inventory of lessons learned and best practices that underpin holistic and gender-sensitive interventions for displaced persons.

As a starting place, humanitarian responses are, in theory, designed to mitigate against severe and systematic increases in vulnerability of a given population. In terms of disasters, vulnerability can be described as a combination of “both the external issues of risks, shocks and stress which people face as well as their internal capacity to cope with the treat to livelihoods without sustaining damaging loss.”[1] Critical to an understanding of vulnerability is the “recognition of coping strategies” adopted by and available to individuals affected by emergency situations. Assessing these strategies using a gender lens means acknowledging that the options available to women and men are predicated on pre-conflict gender relations that may either be improved or exacerbated by conflict on the one hand and that can determine relative access to available resources on the other. [2]

That said, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) lists the following as real benefits culled from a responsible gender analysis of a given humanitarian crisis:

a gender analysis (1) supports a more accurate understanding of the situation; (2) enables the design of more appropriate responses; (3) draws attention to underlying issues of power; (4) provides a link between humanitarian assistance and longer-term development assistance; and (5) profiles and seeks to understand vulnerabilities and capacities of affected parties. [3]

In addition, the CIDA handbook recognizes that the simple biological distinction of being either male or female in an emergency situation yields real differences in access to resources and resultant vulnerabilities and capacities.[4] In the same vein, a BRIDGE report on gender and emergencies succinctly states “a gender approach accords with the recognition that in emergency situations there are winners as well as losers, with women likely to lose more than men.”[5]

As gender relations condition all aspects of men and women’s lives, a gender perspective of humanitarian assistance programming is most effective when it cuts across every sector that is traditionally impacted by crisis. Those sectors include, but are not limited to: Protection and Human Rights, Food and Agriculture, Water and Sanitation, Health, Education, and Economic Recovery and Reconstruction.[6] In the event of an emergency or disaster, women’s and men’s lives will be negatively, neutrally or positively affected in each of the above categories, and the degree to which an intervention addresses that impact by minimizing harm and maximizing capabilities is the degree to which that program should be judged successful and just (for a list of relevant questions to ask under each sector, please see Appendix C).

It is also important to note that gender relations remain largely in flux during conflict. In other words, gender norms and expectations of women and men prior to the outbreak of conflict can undergo profound change and transformation as a result of conflict, and can again change and transform after the fighting subsides.[7] Sensitive programming and interventions will have mechanisms built into them that both acknowledge and respond to the fluidity of gender norms throughout the conflict cycle.

Some common constraints to gender-just programming in emergencies include: host country ambivalence, lack of education, recognition, and training, lack of recognition of women’s capabilities, cultural constraints, and time, resource and energy constraints.[8] In addition, in many cases implementation tends to be driven by urgency and tendency to implement from the top down, conditions which do not typically allow for the flourishing of a consultative process on their own.[9]

Overall, there is resounding agreement that the best way to ensure that women’s needs are met by outside programming is to involve them directly with the humanitarian response process. Full and responsible consultation with women and other marginalized groups is not necessarily easy or intuitive but it an absolutely essential component of developing logistics, operations, and programs that are responsive and inclusive to the needs of those with (often) the least access to the levers of power and influence.

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[1] BRIDGE Report, p. 8.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). “Gender Equality and Humanitarian Assistance: A Guide to the Issues.

[4] Ibid.

[5] BRIDGE Report, p. 8.

[6] Ibid, p. 16.

[7] Professor Rojas’ Course Source

[8] BRIDGE Report. P. 36.

[9] Ibid.

Assessing GoT/TRC Programming for Gender Sensitivity: Challenges and Limitations

As referenced in my discussion of chosen methodologies, I began my internship with a very clear plan and approach for soliciting responses from TRC field staff. I worked closely with both the Head of the Department of International Programs at TRC as well as a translator to fine-tune the wording of the questionnaire that was to be my primary method of collecting feedback for analysis (see Appendix B). The first and most major challenge that I faced was the total lack of political will on behalf of TRC upper management to facilitate the survey in the field. The message from the top was that conducting a gender assessment was “neither practical nor relevant” for field teams to be expected to complete.[1] That the leadership at TRC was not interested in facilitating a serious audit of current camp operations and programs is hard to believe given that: (1) no assessment has been attempted since Syrians began fleeing their homes in 2011; and (2) gender impact evaluations are one of the first things potential donors look at before deciding when and how much to allocate to a humanitarian operation.[2]

            
When a primary assessment of TRC field staff was no longer an option, I turned to gauging the perceptions, experiences and observations of stakeholders external to TRC implementation in the camps. The second challenge I faced was locating a large enough pool of stakeholders who could inform my understanding of the situation in the camps and do so in a way that provided diversity of experience and perception. Not every UN agency in Ankara is engaged in the Syrian operation (in fact, most UN agencies do not have a direct presence established near the camps at all), and the GoT has been careful to keep INGOs from establishing a presence in the camps as either monitoring bodies or direct implementers. International Crisis Group reports that “37 international NGOs are working in various guises along Turkey’s southern border and inside northern Syria, seventeen of them with an informal green light from local Turkish authorities”, but also that the UN and EU are completely absent from the camps themselves.[3]  

There is a significant NGO community comprised of Turkish and Syrian NGOs like Kimse Yok Mu Dernegi and Insan Hak ve Hürrietyleri Insani Yardīm Vakfī (IHH) but they focus entirely on Syrians living in urban areas and are not involved in camp management activities. Ongoing communication with two British journalists who have moved from Gaziantep to Hatay, two of the largest provinces in the south that host significant numbers of Syrians both in-and outside of the camps, reveals the sheer improbability of finding organizations to either work with or shadow during the course of daily operations.[4] These organizations are either not interested in taking on outside help or concerned about the liability of hosting foreigners in light of the heightened threat of kidnap-for-ransom along the border.[5]

           
Thirdly, identifying stakeholders did not necessarily translate to improved access to information. For example, I was told outright that GoT officials would not speak to me directly, but beyond the GoT/TRC contingent, I found it most difficult to speak with some of the more involved parties, like UNHCR. I was told by an official at IOM that UNHCR was unlikely to cooperate with this particular analysis in order to avoid the risk of overt politicization of their perceptions of and experience with camp operations.  The status of UN agencies and INGOs operating within Turkey is delicate and sensitive to political shifts in the wind, and the rigorous approval process that one UNHCR official went through in order to speak with me suggests that their position in the camps is a carefully guarded –and, tenuous –one.  In addition, one UN representative would only to speak to me on condition of complete anonymity, even going as far as to request that her associated agency go unnamed.

           
Fourthly, even when stakeholders agreed to a discussion of how they are involved in the operations themselves, I sensed significant frustration and resignation on behalf of personnel who are essentially hamstrung by government interference or unwillingness to cooperate. The only information UN agencies have to work with comes directly from government offices because UN personnel themselves are largely unable to collect or monitor data within the camps. Based on interviews with an anonymous gender expert, the US State Department, IOM, International Crisis Group, WFP and UNHCR, it is clear that official visits to camp residents occur infrequently and are highly structured, meaning that ease of access and communication with Syrians themselves are circumscribed, making it difficult for outside observers to grasp a complete picture of camp life.

          
Lastly, there seems to be conflicting narratives of which half of the TRC/GoT paradigm is responsible for camp management. Conversations with TRC personnel suggest that TRC is merely supporting government-programming efforts with the provision of non-food items (NFIs) and co-implementation (along with the World Food Programme) of the electronic food voucher program. Conversations with external stakeholders suggest differently, namely that TRC is responsible for day-to-day camp management and the GoT itself is coordinating the assistance and activities of the international community. One International Federation for Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) representative mentioned that this divergence in narrative points to the GoT’s persistent need to project absolute control over operations

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[1] Conversation with Deputy Head of the Department of International Programs. June 22, 2013.

[2] Scot Nanivazo. “Foreign Aid fro Gender Equality: The Challenge for Donors.” Research and Communication on Foreign Aid. Available online at http://recom.wider.unu.edu/article/foreign-aid-gender-equality-challenge-donors. August 2012.

[3] International Crisis Group. “Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey,” Crisis Group Europe Report N°225, 30 April 2013, p. 17.

[4] Killian Redden. Personal Communication. July 15, 2013.

[5] Amanda Rivkin (freelance journalist). Personal Correspondence. July 17, 2013.