As referenced in my discussion of
chosen methodologies, I began my internship with a very clear plan and approach
for soliciting responses from TRC field staff. I worked closely with both the
Head of the Department of International Programs at TRC as well as a translator
to fine-tune the wording of the questionnaire that was to be my primary method
of collecting feedback for analysis (see Appendix B). The first and most major
challenge that I faced was the total lack of political will on behalf of TRC
upper management to facilitate the survey in the field. The message from the
top was that conducting a gender assessment was “neither practical nor
relevant” for field teams to be expected to complete.[1]
That the leadership at TRC was not interested in facilitating a serious audit
of current camp operations and programs is hard to believe given that: (1) no
assessment has been attempted since Syrians began fleeing their homes in 2011;
and (2) gender impact evaluations are one of the first things potential donors
look at before deciding when and how much to allocate to a humanitarian
operation.[2]
When a primary assessment of TRC field staff was no longer an option, I turned to gauging the perceptions, experiences and observations of stakeholders external to TRC implementation in the camps. The second challenge I faced was locating a large enough pool of stakeholders who could inform my understanding of the situation in the camps and do so in a way that provided diversity of experience and perception. Not every UN agency in Ankara is engaged in the Syrian operation (in fact, most UN agencies do not have a direct presence established near the camps at all), and the GoT has been careful to keep INGOs from establishing a presence in the camps as either monitoring bodies or direct implementers. International Crisis Group reports that “37 international NGOs are working in various guises along Turkey’s southern border and inside northern Syria, seventeen of them with an informal green light from local Turkish authorities”, but also that the UN and EU are completely absent from the camps themselves.[3]
There is a significant NGO community comprised of Turkish and Syrian NGOs like Kimse Yok Mu Dernegi and Insan Hak ve Hürrietyleri Insani Yardīm Vakfī (IHH) but they focus entirely on Syrians living in urban areas and are not involved in camp management activities. Ongoing communication with two British journalists who have moved from Gaziantep to Hatay, two of the largest provinces in the south that host significant numbers of Syrians both in-and outside of the camps, reveals the sheer improbability of finding organizations to either work with or shadow during the course of daily operations.[4] These organizations are either not interested in taking on outside help or concerned about the liability of hosting foreigners in light of the heightened threat of kidnap-for-ransom along the border.[5]
Thirdly, identifying stakeholders did not necessarily translate to improved access to information. For example, I was told outright that GoT officials would not speak to me directly, but beyond the GoT/TRC contingent, I found it most difficult to speak with some of the more involved parties, like UNHCR. I was told by an official at IOM that UNHCR was unlikely to cooperate with this particular analysis in order to avoid the risk of overt politicization of their perceptions of and experience with camp operations. The status of UN agencies and INGOs operating within Turkey is delicate and sensitive to political shifts in the wind, and the rigorous approval process that one UNHCR official went through in order to speak with me suggests that their position in the camps is a carefully guarded –and, tenuous –one. In addition, one UN representative would only to speak to me on condition of complete anonymity, even going as far as to request that her associated agency go unnamed.
Fourthly, even when stakeholders agreed to a discussion of how they are involved in the operations themselves, I sensed significant frustration and resignation on behalf of personnel who are essentially hamstrung by government interference or unwillingness to cooperate. The only information UN agencies have to work with comes directly from government offices because UN personnel themselves are largely unable to collect or monitor data within the camps. Based on interviews with an anonymous gender expert, the US State Department, IOM, International Crisis Group, WFP and UNHCR, it is clear that official visits to camp residents occur infrequently and are highly structured, meaning that ease of access and communication with Syrians themselves are circumscribed, making it difficult for outside observers to grasp a complete picture of camp life.
Lastly, there seems to be conflicting narratives of which half of the TRC/GoT paradigm is responsible for camp management. Conversations with TRC personnel suggest that TRC is merely supporting government-programming efforts with the provision of non-food items (NFIs) and co-implementation (along with the World Food Programme) of the electronic food voucher program. Conversations with external stakeholders suggest differently, namely that TRC is responsible for day-to-day camp management and the GoT itself is coordinating the assistance and activities of the international community. One International Federation for Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) representative mentioned that this divergence in narrative points to the GoT’s persistent need to project absolute control over operations
[1] Conversation with Deputy Head of the Department of
International Programs. June 22, 2013.
[2] Scot Nanivazo. “Foreign Aid fro Gender Equality: The
Challenge for Donors.” Research and Communication on Foreign Aid. Available
online at http://recom.wider.unu.edu/article/foreign-aid-gender-equality-challenge-donors. August 2012.
[3] International Crisis Group. “Blurring
the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey,” Crisis Group Europe Report
N°225, 30 April 2013, p. 17.
[4] Killian Redden. Personal Communication. July 15, 2013.
[5] Amanda Rivkin (freelance journalist). Personal Correspondence.
July 17, 2013.
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