From the beginning, the Turkish Government has treated Syrians as if they were “guests” seeking temporary reprieve from a violent situation. Government officials predicted that the crisis would be short-lived and based early interventions for displaced Syrians on the notion that their stay would be an abbreviated one. This assumption also partially explains the government’s early resistance to overtures from the international community as well as the difficulty it faced with establishing a uniform registration system prior to June 2012[1], a mishap, in retrospect, that has contributed to the ongoing
challenge of reporting accurate numbers of Syrians who are not living in camps.
In terms of reports on the conditions within Turkish camps for Syrian refugees, it makes sense to differentiate between material conditions (the quality of physical infrastructure, security, and the provision of food and non-food items, etc.) and non-material conditions (access to and quality of basic services, availability of psychosocial support, etc.), primarily because there exists a disparity between the two in most camps.
Material Infrastructure
Despite positive feedback from visits to camps by external actors, it seems clear that material conditions and levels of comfort enjoyed by Syrians vary from camp to camp. Generally, container camps are better-equipped and more comfortable than tent camps, which make up the majority of available facilities.
The overall security of camps seems to be quite good, with differences in threats to physical safety largely dependent on each camp’s proximity to the border. Law enforcement is comprised of both gendarmerie and privately contracted officer, female security guards form part of the camp security detail, and the relationship between camp residents and security guards was reported as friendly. In addition to well-developed security around the perimeter of camps, one interviewee noted that within one camp, certain areas had been cordoned off for single male inhabitants to occupy on their own. This was apparently done after some female residents raised the concern that they felt uncomfortable with single males roaming campgrounds freely.[4]
Most interviewees reported that they had observed friendly interactions between camp staff and camp residents, but a more thorough interview process conducted with Syrian women in Osmaniye and Nizip camps suggests that camp staff would greatly benefit from cultural sensitivity training as residents felt resentment and tension between themselves and staff.[5]
Non-Material Infrastructure
This program is currently active in 14 camps and TRC/WFP have plans to roll out the e-voucher program to the remaining camps in the coming months. The program itself not only enables Syrians to resume the kind of activities that underpin some semblance of normalcy (like shop for groceries, interact with shopkeepers, cook a variety of meals), but it has resulted in huge cost-savings for the Turkish government. When WFP first arrived in country, the Turkish government was spending between 140 and 170USD per person per day on hot meals that were prepared by camp management staff.[7] The e-voucher program has essentially halved food and nutrition costs and, at the same time, attempts to renew in survivors a sense of self-reliance and ownership over day-to-day activities.
Access to education has been something of a mixed bag for both adult and child learners living with the camps. Early on, low numbers of Arabic speakers made it difficult to enable young children to continue their studies in Arabic, although it also seems that TRC has made Turkish language lessons available where possible. One interviewee reported that classrooms that she observed were not sex-segregated and that the children seemed relaxed and well-adjusted to their surroundings, although she did come across one girl who did not attend classes because her family would not allow it.[8] Another observer remarked that a fairly equal number of boys and girls appeared to be in attendance in the classrooms.
An early draft of a needs assessment report completed by a SGBV consultant and her colleagues during visits to Nizip and Osmaniye camps, however, indicates that many women are unable to take advantage of adult-learning courses because their husbands will not allow them to participate. Overall, her team fielded requests for greater access to educational outlets and Turkish language courses at all levels.[9]
As part of their status as Temporarily Protected Persons, Syrian camp residents are unable to procure temporary work permits for any part of their stay in Turkey. In speaking with a SGBV consultant familiar with camp operations, it was noted that the current high demand for Arabic-speaking teachers could be addressed by making provisions for camp residents who were teachers in Syria to work-for-pay, but because the government refuses to issue temporary work permits to Syrians, any work that a Syrian teacher would perform within the camps would go unpaid. [11]
This phenomenon of working for free or working for far less than their Turkish counterparts has been reported widely throughout the country, with one commentator arguing that Syrians have become the new working class in Turkey.[12] Instances of survival sex and prostitution were reported[13], but because a UN-sponsored needs assessment of this phenomenon is still underway, accurate figures for the degree to which this impacts women’s lives in the camps is unknown (the cropping up of women selling sex for survival and protection will be explored at greater length in the subsequent section). The same report noted that the significant burden of finding paid work in the informal sector falls heavily on women, who are often heads-of-household as a result of either the death or involvement of their husbands in the anti-Assad insurgency.[14]
There is some level of political organization within the camps, for both women and men, although only 40% of the camps have official camp committees in place and two camps have no female representatives at all.[15] Almost all camps, however, feature a mukhtar (“chosen”, or headman) system, which has formed out of democratic elections of representatives within camp communities. In some camps, there are both male and female mukhtar committees, although it is not clear what level of decision-making power each committee has and whether or not constituents feel that the mukhtar committees function as strong liaisons between constituents themselves and camp administration.
Interestingly, instances where interpersonal and intercultural conflict has erupted within the camps are around the issue of child and polygamous marriage. Having ratified both the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in addition to drafting the Child Protection Law, Turkish law identifies children as individuals less than 18 years of age. A recently revised Civil Code stipulates that the statutory age limit for marriage is 17 for both women and men, whereas prior to 2002, the limit was 15 and 17 for women and men, respectively. In practice, however, UNFPA reports that child marriage is practiced throughout Turkey, with a heavier concentration of cases in Central East Anatolia, an area that shares ethnic and cultural ties to the many Syrians now living in Turkey.[17]
It was reported by several sources that GoT/TRC is not consistent with its response to child marriage in Syrian camps, opting in some cases to turn a blind eye and in others to unequivocally forbid the practice, a development one official finds ironic given how rampant it is in nearby Turkish towns.[18] This challenge is not one faced by the Turkish government alone; in fact, it is also a reality many officials are forced to confront in camps throughout Jordan.
On the subject of forced [child] marriage, unofficial religious marriages in Zaatari Camp are a serious concern, but on the other side, they are seen by some (women, girls and/or their families) as a protection mechanism. This is proving an incredibly difficult issue to tackle, particularly without sounding alarm bells that may cause more harm. [19]
Because healthcare practices in the camps and the scarcity of psychosocial support for survivors of sexual and violent trauma are two components that have contributed to some of the largest gender gaps in GoT/TRC programming, these two areas will be explored in great detail in the subsequent section.
challenge of reporting accurate numbers of Syrians who are not living in camps.
In terms of reports on the conditions within Turkish camps for Syrian refugees, it makes sense to differentiate between material conditions (the quality of physical infrastructure, security, and the provision of food and non-food items, etc.) and non-material conditions (access to and quality of basic services, availability of psychosocial support, etc.), primarily because there exists a disparity between the two in most camps.
Material Infrastructure
The
overall impression of the camps from a material perspective is overwhelmingly
positive. State Department officials who had visited the Kilis camp reported
that it was “5 star” in quality and boasted homes with running water and flat-screen
TVs as well as access to laundry facilities. In most camps, children have
designated areas to play, and vocational training in sewing and rug making for
women are available. Children also have access to Turkish language classes and
are increasingly able to continue primary school studies in Arabic, although
the government was slow to procure Arabic speaking individuals to help run camp
operations.[2]
The International Crisis Group has documented similar reports of Syrians
enjoying a “5-star experience”, with some outside observers commenting that
these camps are the best they had ever seen.[3]
Despite positive feedback from visits to camps by external actors, it seems clear that material conditions and levels of comfort enjoyed by Syrians vary from camp to camp. Generally, container camps are better-equipped and more comfortable than tent camps, which make up the majority of available facilities.
The overall security of camps seems to be quite good, with differences in threats to physical safety largely dependent on each camp’s proximity to the border. Law enforcement is comprised of both gendarmerie and privately contracted officer, female security guards form part of the camp security detail, and the relationship between camp residents and security guards was reported as friendly. In addition to well-developed security around the perimeter of camps, one interviewee noted that within one camp, certain areas had been cordoned off for single male inhabitants to occupy on their own. This was apparently done after some female residents raised the concern that they felt uncomfortable with single males roaming campgrounds freely.[4]
Most interviewees reported that they had observed friendly interactions between camp staff and camp residents, but a more thorough interview process conducted with Syrian women in Osmaniye and Nizip camps suggests that camp staff would greatly benefit from cultural sensitivity training as residents felt resentment and tension between themselves and staff.[5]
Non-Material Infrastructure
The primary program in support of food security within
the camps is one of the bright spots of the ongoing effort to care for
displaced Syrians. In partnership with WFP, TRC kicked off a program that
enables Syrian families to purchase pre-approved food items from participating
vendors both within camps and in nearby towns and cities. Each person within a
family unit receives two installments of 40TL (approximately 40USD) on an
electronic card each month.[6]
Using these cards, families can choose from a variety of foodstuffs (with the
exception of alcohol and junk food) and can prepare meals using kitchen
equipment provided by camp management.
This program is currently active in 14 camps and TRC/WFP have plans to roll out the e-voucher program to the remaining camps in the coming months. The program itself not only enables Syrians to resume the kind of activities that underpin some semblance of normalcy (like shop for groceries, interact with shopkeepers, cook a variety of meals), but it has resulted in huge cost-savings for the Turkish government. When WFP first arrived in country, the Turkish government was spending between 140 and 170USD per person per day on hot meals that were prepared by camp management staff.[7] The e-voucher program has essentially halved food and nutrition costs and, at the same time, attempts to renew in survivors a sense of self-reliance and ownership over day-to-day activities.
Access to education has been something of a mixed bag for both adult and child learners living with the camps. Early on, low numbers of Arabic speakers made it difficult to enable young children to continue their studies in Arabic, although it also seems that TRC has made Turkish language lessons available where possible. One interviewee reported that classrooms that she observed were not sex-segregated and that the children seemed relaxed and well-adjusted to their surroundings, although she did come across one girl who did not attend classes because her family would not allow it.[8] Another observer remarked that a fairly equal number of boys and girls appeared to be in attendance in the classrooms.
An early draft of a needs assessment report completed by a SGBV consultant and her colleagues during visits to Nizip and Osmaniye camps, however, indicates that many women are unable to take advantage of adult-learning courses because their husbands will not allow them to participate. Overall, her team fielded requests for greater access to educational outlets and Turkish language courses at all levels.[9]
The
ability to generate income as a Syrian refugee living in Turkey remains a major
challenge. Within the camps, management offers training in traditional
vocations for residents. For example, women are able to learn carpet weaving
and beautician trades[10]
but there is no opportunity to expand skill sets outside of traditional niches.
As part of their status as Temporarily Protected Persons, Syrian camp residents are unable to procure temporary work permits for any part of their stay in Turkey. In speaking with a SGBV consultant familiar with camp operations, it was noted that the current high demand for Arabic-speaking teachers could be addressed by making provisions for camp residents who were teachers in Syria to work-for-pay, but because the government refuses to issue temporary work permits to Syrians, any work that a Syrian teacher would perform within the camps would go unpaid. [11]
This phenomenon of working for free or working for far less than their Turkish counterparts has been reported widely throughout the country, with one commentator arguing that Syrians have become the new working class in Turkey.[12] Instances of survival sex and prostitution were reported[13], but because a UN-sponsored needs assessment of this phenomenon is still underway, accurate figures for the degree to which this impacts women’s lives in the camps is unknown (the cropping up of women selling sex for survival and protection will be explored at greater length in the subsequent section). The same report noted that the significant burden of finding paid work in the informal sector falls heavily on women, who are often heads-of-household as a result of either the death or involvement of their husbands in the anti-Assad insurgency.[14]
There is some level of political organization within the camps, for both women and men, although only 40% of the camps have official camp committees in place and two camps have no female representatives at all.[15] Almost all camps, however, feature a mukhtar (“chosen”, or headman) system, which has formed out of democratic elections of representatives within camp communities. In some camps, there are both male and female mukhtar committees, although it is not clear what level of decision-making power each committee has and whether or not constituents feel that the mukhtar committees function as strong liaisons between constituents themselves and camp administration.
One
State Department official recalled a time when the embassy actively pressured
TRC camp management to require the formation of a female mukhtar committee in a camp with only male representation. She
recalled that TRC’s response reflected a “live and let live” ethos, one in
which the Turkish government would only intervene in camp affairs when absolutely
necessary.[16]
Interestingly, instances where interpersonal and intercultural conflict has erupted within the camps are around the issue of child and polygamous marriage. Having ratified both the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in addition to drafting the Child Protection Law, Turkish law identifies children as individuals less than 18 years of age. A recently revised Civil Code stipulates that the statutory age limit for marriage is 17 for both women and men, whereas prior to 2002, the limit was 15 and 17 for women and men, respectively. In practice, however, UNFPA reports that child marriage is practiced throughout Turkey, with a heavier concentration of cases in Central East Anatolia, an area that shares ethnic and cultural ties to the many Syrians now living in Turkey.[17]
It was reported by several sources that GoT/TRC is not consistent with its response to child marriage in Syrian camps, opting in some cases to turn a blind eye and in others to unequivocally forbid the practice, a development one official finds ironic given how rampant it is in nearby Turkish towns.[18] This challenge is not one faced by the Turkish government alone; in fact, it is also a reality many officials are forced to confront in camps throughout Jordan.
On the subject of forced [child] marriage, unofficial religious marriages in Zaatari Camp are a serious concern, but on the other side, they are seen by some (women, girls and/or their families) as a protection mechanism. This is proving an incredibly difficult issue to tackle, particularly without sounding alarm bells that may cause more harm. [19]
Even in Turkish camps, which
are comparatively better equipped and secured than Lebanese or Jordanian
counter-examples, early and forced marriages have sprung up in alarming numbers
as a way to ensure that young girls are both protected and leveraged to secure
a bride price for families with little to no income.[20]
Because healthcare practices in the camps and the scarcity of psychosocial support for survivors of sexual and violent trauma are two components that have contributed to some of the largest gender gaps in GoT/TRC programming, these two areas will be explored in great detail in the subsequent section.
[1] US State Department
Official #2. Interview. June 7, 2013.
[2] US State Department
Official #1. Interview. June 7, 2013.
[3] Hugh Pope. Country
Director of International Crisis Group. Interview. July 19, 2013.
[4] State Department
Official #2. Interview. June 7, 2013.
[7] WFP Official.
Interview. July 18, 2013.
[8] State Department
Official #1. Interview. June 7, 2013.
[9] SGBV Consultant.
“Report on Humanitarian Gender Based Violence (GBV) needs Assessment.” May 22 –
28, 2013.
[11] SGBV Consultant.
Interview. June 9, 2013.
[12] Hugh Pope, Country
Director of International Crisis Group/Turkey. Interview. July 19, 2013.
[13] SGBV Consultant.
“Report on Humanitarian Gender Based Violence (GBV) needs Assessment.” May 22 –
28, 2013.
[14] SGBV Consultant.
Interview. June 9, 2013.
[16] State Department
Official #2. Interview. June 7, 2013.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Abbie Taylor. Personal
Correspondence. June 24th, 2013.
No comments:
Post a Comment